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Processes and Setting the Research Agenda* 
Louise Austin and Richard Huxtable 
1. Introduction 
In the mid-2000s, the English courts adjudicated on the high-profile case of Charlotte Wyatt, a 
critically ill child. Charlotte’s parents wanted their daughter to receive potentially life-
sustaining treatment (including ventilation), but her doctors believed that such treatment was 
not in the child’s best interests.1 This intractable dispute came before the courts on no fewer 
than 11 occasions.2 Commenting on the dispute, Margaret Brazier noted: ‘There is no right 
answer to the dilemma in Re Wyatt. Resolution in the courts may indeed exacerbate a tragedy 
nature created. But is there any alternative?’3  
Brazier’s question has become particularly pressing in recent years, with the courts confronting 
more difficult cases of this sort, such as Gard, and the attendant dilemmas playing out across 
the world’s (social) media.4 In this chapter, we survey and assess the main processes and 
mechanisms available for seeking to prevent, reduce or resolve disputes about the treatment 
(and non-treatment) of critically ill children. Our focus is on the UK (and England in 
 
* RH’s work on this chapter was supported by a ‘Balancing Best Interests in Health Care, Ethics 
and Law (BABEL)’ Collaborative Award from the Wellcome Trust (209841/Z/17/Z). The 
chapter draws on a review, led by LA, which was undertaken for the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics. We are grateful to the Council for permission to develop the review here and we are 
also grateful to our colleagues, Neera Bhatia, Giles Birchley and Jonathan Ives, for their input 
into that review. Responsibility for the chapter lies with the authors. 
1 Portsmouth Hospital Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam). 
2 J Bridgeman, ‘Editorial: Critically Ill Children and Best Interests’ (2010) 5 Clinical Ethics, 184, 187. 
3 M Brazier, ‘An Intractable Dispute: When Parents and Professionals Disagree’ (2005) 13 Medical 
Law Review 412, 418. 
4 N Bhatia, ‘Disagreements in the Care of Critically Ill Children: Emerging Issues in a Changing 
Landscape’ (2018) Nuffield Council on Bioethics 7, nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Bhatia-
N-2018-Disagreements-in-care-of-critically-ill-children-emerging-issues.pdf. 
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particular5) and our analysis was informed by a ‘rapid review’ of available sources,6 which was 
undertaken for the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.7  
The review revealed five key processes for resolving disagreements about the care of critically 
ill children: discussions between families and clinicians; second-opinion experts; clinical ethics 
committees; mediation; and court proceedings. We found that the majority of these disputes 
appear to be addressed and resolved through discussion between the main stakeholders, 
primarily the parents and the healthcare team, with second opinions sometimes also being 
sought. Alternative processes – and the courts in particular – appeared to be viewed by 
stakeholders as options of last resort. Court proceedings had (at least) the benefit of securing 
resolution, but such resolution came at a cost, since it could exacerbate the damage already 
caused to the relationship of trust between these protagonists. Alternative processes such as 
mediation and clinical ethics consultation showed some promise, but data about these processes 
and their respective pros and cons appear to be lacking.  
Our findings therefore indicate various areas in which further research is warranted. First, 
further research is needed into what the current situation actually is, which would usefully 
explore when, why, how and the extent to which these different mechanisms are used, and how 
they serve to secure resolution. Second, research is also needed into what the situation should 
be: how (if at all) should existing mechanisms be amended and, ultimately, which process (or 
processes) should be used in these cases of conflict? 
2. Critically Ill Infants in (and Beyond) the Courts 
Although cases of conflict have become particularly prominent in recent years, the 
treatment/non-treatment of critically ill children has long generated dilemmas and 
disagreement. As these dilemmas typically involve life-or-death questions, legal questions 
inevitably arise, and English law has a long history of seeking to resolve these sorts of disputes. 
 
5 Different legal systems operate within the United Kingdom.  
6 Rapid reviews involve ‘a type of knowledge synthesis in which components of the systematic review 
process are simplified or omitted to produce information in a short period of time’: AC Tricco, J Antony, 
W Zarin, L Strifler, M Ghassemi, J Ivory, L Perrier, B Hutton, D Moher, and SE Straus, ‘A Scoping 
Review of Rapid Review Methods’ (2015) 13 BioMed Central Medicine 224. 
7 L Austin, ‘UK Processes for the Resolution of Disagreements About the Care of Critically Ill Children’ 
(2018) Nuffield Council on Bioethics, nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Austin-L-2018-UK-
processes-for-resolution-of-disagreements-in-care-of-critically-ill-children.pdf. 
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The law in this jurisdiction has generally viewed these sorts of cases through three sets of 
lenses, which derive from criminal law, civil (family) law and human rights law.8  
In terms of priority and chronology, the criminal law comes first in this selective retrospective 
(or, to borrow a phrase that has fallen into desuetude, ‘selective non-treatment’ retrospective).9 
Failing to meet a duty to care for a dependent, which results in that dependent’s death, can 
amount to murder or manslaughter, depending on the accused’s intention or knowledge.10,11 
The last such trial involving a doctor occurred in 1981, when Dr Arthur, a paediatrician, was 
acquitted of attempting to murder John Pearson. After the parents rejected the new-born, who 
had Down’s syndrome, Dr Arthur prescribed a painkiller and ordered ‘nursing care only’. The 
child died 69 hours later.12 In his direction to the jury, Farquharson J noted there was no ‘special 
law’ protecting doctors,13 but he also pointed to the lawfulness of some omissions and of 
symptom relief, plus the good character and motives of the defendant, who had allegedly been 
following accepted practice.   
Farquharson J’s direction indicated his discomfort with examining Arthur’s behaviour through 
the criminal law lens – indeed, the defendant was described in respectful terms, while the child 
was referred to as ‘it’.14 A different legal lens was already available, based in the civil – and 
specifically family – law, and it had been deployed in a ruling passed down only weeks before 
Farquharson J’s direction, although he did not cite it. Contrary to the decision in Arthur, in Re 
B, the Court of Appeal authorised the provision of life-saving surgery in the ‘best interests’ of 
another new-born with Down’s syndrome, as the court found it was not the case that ‘the life 
of this child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned 
to die’.15 Like Arthur, that decision also had unfortunate aspects, since the appellate judges 
referred to the possibility that the child might be a ‘cabbage’.16 
 
8 This section expands on points first made in R Huxtable, ‘Clinic, Courtroom or (Specialist) 
Committee: In the Best of Interests of the Critically Ill Child?’ (2017) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 
471.  
9 ibid, 471. 
10 Gibbins v Proctor [1918] 12 Cr App Rep 134. 
11 R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354. 
12 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1. 
13 ibid, [5]. 
14 ibid. 
15 Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 927, 929 (Re B). 
16 ibid, 1423.  
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Hopefully the more troubling features of these two decisions can be consigned to legal 
history,17 but Re B’s central focus on the ‘best interests’ or – following the Children Act 1989 
– the ‘welfare’ of the child otherwise continues to lead the way in these decisions. Using these 
tests, which are to be considered synonymous,18 the courts have decided on numerous 
occasions that life-sustaining treatment is not indicated.19 Neither concept has been defined but 
five key elements of the legal position emerge from the 1989 Act and subsequent rulings.20 
First, as the 1989 Act states, ‘the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration’.21 This remains the test and, in the aforementioned Wyatt, the Court of Appeal 
took pains to emphasise that references to an ‘intolerably’ poor quality of life,22 which might 
be considered – in Re B’s words – ‘demonstrably … awful’,23 are not to be treated as 
supplementary tests.24 Second, ‘the judge must look at the question from the assumed point of 
view of the patient’.25 Third, there is a strong presumption in favour of prolonging life, but this 
presumption can be rebutted.26 Fourth, ‘best interests’ is a broad, pluralistic concept, which 
‘encompasses medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues’.27 Rather than offering a 
definition, the Act only provides a checklist of factors to consider, which includes the needs 
 
17 However, the troubling term ‘vegetative state’ continues to be used, although there are calls for its 
abandonment, eg: S Laureys, GG Celesia, F Cohado, J Lavrijsen, J León-Carrión, G Sannita, L Sazbon, 
E Schmutzhard, KR von Wild, A Zeman, G Dolce and the European Task Force on Disorders of 
Consciousness, ‘Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A New Name for the Vegetative State or 
Apallic Syndrome’ (2010) 8 BioMed Central Medicine 68.  
18 Re B (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1987] 2 WLR 1213, 1217. 
19 See, eg, Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] Fam 26; Re J (a minor) (wardship: 
medical treatment) [1991] 1 FLR 366; Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 165; 
Re C (a baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43; Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 All ER 966; 
Re C (medical treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384; Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust v B [2000] 2 
FCR 76; A National Health Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677; Re L (a child) (medical treatment: 
benefit) [2004] EWHC 2713; NHS Trust v A (a child) [2007] EWHC 1696; Re K (a child) (withdrawal 
of treatment) [2006] EWHC 1007; Re B (a child) (medical treatment) [2008] EWHC 1996; Re OT 
[2009] EWHC 633. For a full discussion of these cases, see R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise 
at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not to Treat? (London, Routledge, 2012), 39-49. 
20 See especially Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181 (Wyatt).  
21 Children Act 1989 s 1(1). 
22 Wyatt (n 20), [91]. 
23 Re B (n 15), 929. 
24 ibid, [91]. Foster, however, has argued that in Re A (male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549, 
‘intolerability’ returned through the ‘balance sheet’ approach advocated in Wyatt (n 30). Foster notes 
that in Re A it was held that the detriments of continuing life would have to significantly outweigh its 
benefits in order for the presumption in favour of continuing life to be overturned. Foster describes this 
as ‘intolerability by another name’: C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of 
Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 160.   
25 Wyatt (n 20), [87]. 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
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and ‘ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child’, and any harm he or she might suffer.28 
Finally, according to the Court of Appeal, ‘The court must conduct a balancing exercise in 
which all the relevant factors are weighed and a helpful way of undertaking this exercise is to 
draw up a balance sheet.’29  
By the time of Wyatt, the family law lens had been supplemented by a third, human 
rights, lens, which was provided by the Human Rights Act 1998. That Act, which came into 
force in 2000, essentially brought the European Convention on Human Rights directly into 
English law. There were soon challenges to the rulings in this area, based (inter alia) on Article 
2, the right to life.30 The English courts nevertheless confirmed that there would be no violation 
of the 1998 Act if a decision not to offer life-supporting treatment was made in the best interests 
of the child.31 The European Court of Human Rights did, however, find against doctors, 
following the complaint in Glass in 2004, in which the relationship between the child’s family 
and his doctors had deteriorated significantly, leading to fistfights on the ward.32 The European 
Court found there to be a violation of Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, 
since the mother’s right to consent to treatment had not been respected. The court further 
emphasised the importance of resolving disputes promptly.33 
Against the backdrop of cases such as Wyatt and Glass, professional organisations sought to 
issue guidance on how future cases should be addressed. Generic guidance – applying to 
patients young and old – was available from the General Medical Council and British Medical 
Association.34 However, more specific guidance was issued by the Royal College of Paediatrics 
and Child Health, first in 1997,35 which was updated in 2004,36 and then again in 2015.37 The 
latest guidance refers to the permissibility of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining 
 
28 Children Act 1989 s 1(3). 
29 Wyatt (n 20), 87. 
30 A National Health Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677. 
31 ibid. 
32 Glass v UK [2004] 1 FCR 553. 
33 ibid, [79]–[81].  
34 General Medical Council, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing – Guidance for Doctors’ (2002) www.gmc-
uk.org/-/media/documents/withholding-or-withdrawing-life-prolonging-treatments-2002---2010-
55677704.pdf; British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical 
Treatment (BMA, 1999).  
35 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Saving Treatment 
in Children: A Framework for Practice (RCPCH, 1997). 
36 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining 
Treatment in Children: A Framework for Practice [1997] (RCPCH, 2004). 
37 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Making Decisions to Limit Treatment in Life-Limiting 
and Life-Threatening Conditions in Children: A Framework for Practice [1997] (RCPCH, 2014). 
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treatment where the child’s life is limited in quantity (since the child is brain-stem dead, 
imminently dying, or his or her death is inevitable and treatment confers no overall benefit) or 
limited in quality (with reference to the burdens of treatment or the child’s underlying 
condition, or the child’s inability to benefit).38 Like its predecessors, the 2015 guidance 
recommends that efforts be taken to resolve disputes.39 Dispute resolution was also considered 
by a working party of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, which issued its report in 2006.40 The 
report found (inter alia) that existing ‘legal principles centred on seeking agreement between 
parents and professionals as to the best interests of the baby are, in principle, appropriate and 
sufficient’,41 although it did recommend that ‘all neonatal intensive care units have rapid access 
to a clinical ethics committee for advice’42 and that further research be undertaken into ‘the 
possible merits’ of mediation in this context.43  
Despite these various efforts to prevent or address disputes, the latter part of the 2010s brought 
a series of high-profile legal cases, of which we will briefly mention four. The first, in 2014, 
involved five-year-old Ashya King, who had undergone surgical removal of a brain tumour. 
His doctors thereafter proposed chemotherapy and radiotherapy, but his parents favoured 
proton beam therapy (PBT). NHS funding for PBT was refused but Ashya’s parents had 
identified a willing centre in Prague and had the requisite funding available. Believing the 
hospital would seek a Child Protection Order to prevent this (which the hospital denied), 
Ashya’s parents removed him from the hospital and took him to Spain. Ashya was subsequently 
made a ward of court and a court hearing convened to determine whether he was at risk of 
significant harm from the plan to take him to Prague for PBT. Drawing on the medical 
evidence, Baker J concluded that the proposed treatment was reasonable, in Ashya’s best 
interests and Ashya was not at risk of harm, so he could be transferred to the unit in Prague, at 
which point he would no longer be a ward of court.44  
 
38 ibid, 4–5. 
39 ibid, 12. 
40 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care Decisions in Foetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical 
Issues (2006), nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CCD-web-version-22-June-07-
updated.pdf. 
41 ibid, [37]. 
42 ibid, [40]. 
43 ibid, [41].  
44 Portsmouth City Council v Nagmeh King, Brett King, Southampton Hospital Trust, Ashya 
King (by his Children’s Guardian) [2014] EWHC 2964 (Fam). 
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Although Ashya’s case generated headlines, the second, involving Charlie Gard in 2017, 
appeared to have even wider, international reach. Charlie, who was eight months old, had a 
form of mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome and was being treated in Great Ormond Street 
Hospital (GOSH). His treating clinicians judged his quality of life to be poor, with no hope of 
recovery, such that continued ventilation would be futile. His parents opposed withdrawal of 
ventilation on the basis that an experimental treatment was available in the United States, which 
might help their son. The hospital was initially prepared to consider such treatment but, 
following Charlie’s deterioration, his treating clinicians concluded that this too would be futile. 
Charlie’s parents maintained that he should be transferred to the United States.45  
In the first substantive ruling, Francis J looked particularly to the (UK) medical evidence, 
deciding that mechanical ventilation was not in Charlie’s best interests.46 The Court of Appeal 
permitted an appeal on certain grounds,47 but the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal, 
finding there was no arguable point of law.48 The European Court of Human Rights also 
declared inadmissible the parents’ attempt to have the case heard in Strasbourg.49 The case did, 
however, return to the High Court, on the basis (inter alia) of new evidence from a US clinician. 
However, during this hearing, the US clinician met with the treating clinicians and reviewed 
up-to-date scans, which led him to conclude that there was no possibility of the nucleoside 
therapy having any effect. Charlie’s parents thereafter withdrew their opposition to the proposal 
to withdraw ventilation and Francis J confirmed his earlier declaration, adding that Charlie 
would continue to be treated at GOSH, before being transferred to an agreed hospice.50   
Two prominent cases were then brought in 2018. The first, involving 11-month-old Isaiah 
Haastrup, concerned whether ventilation should be withdrawn on the grounds of ‘futility’.51 
Isaiah had been born by emergency caesarean section due to uterus rupture, which led to him 
sustaining severe hypoxic ischaemic brain injury. The circumstances of his birth reportedly led 
 
45 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Constance Yates, Chris Gard, Charles Gard (a Child by his 
Guardian Ad Litem) [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam). 
46 ibid. 
47 Constance Yates, Christopher Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation 
Trust Charles Gard (a Child, by his Guardian) [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
48 In the matter of Charlie Gard (8 June 2017), www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-
hearing-in-the-matter-of-charlie-gard.html. 
49 Gard and Others v UK (app no 39793-17) [2017] ECHR. 
50 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates and Others [2017] EWHC 
1909. 
51 King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Thomas, Haastrup and Haastrup [2018] EWHC 
127 (Fam) (Haastrup). 
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to a breakdown in trust between the parents and the hospital, which worsened when, shortly 
after his birth, Isaiah’s parents were advised he was unlikely to recover and the possibility of 
palliative care was raised, following which Isaiah appeared to become more responsive. 
Various other doctors – including from other units – reviewed Isaiah, but they all concluded 
that further treatment was futile and ventilation should be withdrawn. Given the breakdown in 
trust, the treating hospital had sought to move Isaiah to another unit, but no willing unit could 
be found, given the perceived futility of further treatment. The court granted Isaiah’s parents 
permission to obtain independent expert evidence from two further experts, but they too 
concurred with the treating clinicians; MacDonald J authorised the withdrawal of treatment 
from Isaiah. 
The second case also concerned the withdrawal of ventilation.52 Alfie Evans, who was nearly 
two at the time of the hearing, had been found (at six months) to have developmental delay and 
had been admitted to Alder Hey Hospital with seizures. The seizures persisted and Alfie was 
noted to have little response to different types of stimulation. No one was able to provide a 
definitive diagnosis of Alfie’s underlying neurological condition but his condition had caused 
such significant brain damage that there was judged to be no prospect of recovery, so the 
hospital wished to withdraw ventilation. Alfie’s parents contested this and wanted their son 
transferred to a hospital in Italy for further investigations and the continuation of life support. 
In light of the medical consensus as to the futility of further treatment, Hayden J concluded that 
treatment was not in Alfie’s best interests. The parents unsuccessfully appealed,53 and 
subsequently brought further proceedings, seeking the same outcome on different legal 
grounds,54 including a failed attempt to initiate a murder prosecution against some of the 
clinicians.55 None of the appeals succeeded. 
Each of these cases appeared to involve intractable disputes, which suggests that they 
inevitably and understandably ended up before the courts. However, prior to that point, each 
had involved recourse to a variety of methods by which the dispute might have been resolved. 
 
52 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Mr Thomas Evans, Ms Kate James, Alfie Evans (a 
Child by his Guardian CAFCASS Legal) [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam) 
53 E (a child) [2018] EWCA Civ 550; Evans v UK 14238/18 [2018] ECHR 297. 
54 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Evans [2018] EWHC 818; Evans v Alder Hey 
Children’s NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 805; Evans v UK (app no 18770/18) [2018] 
ECHR 357; Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Evans [2018] EWHC 953; Evans v Alder 
Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 984. 
55  Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Evans [2018] EWHC 953, [14]. 
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In the following sections, we review and assess some of the main methods, starting with 
discussions between families and clinicians.  
3. Discussions between Families and Clinicians 
As the aforementioned cases indicate, it is typical for clinicians and families (in particular, 
parents) to meet to discuss the child’s condition, prognosis and treatment/non-treatment 
options. The process appears initially to involve discussions between the treating team, before 
a discussion (or discussions) is then held with the family.  
The aim of such discussions is apparently to achieve consensus through ‘shared 
decision-making’.56 There is, however, no fixed definition of the latter concept,57 nor 
agreement on whether it is entirely suited to paediatric decision-making.58 Drawing on 
qualitative research with key participants in such decisions, some researchers have suggested 
that, in practice, these discussions might amount to no more than a consultation of the parents’ 
views, with the true aim being to secure their acquiescence to the care plan proposed by the 
clinical team.59 Efforts at persuasion appeared to feature in the cases just outlined. There is a 
risk, however, that such efforts will cause parents to feel they have no real choice in decision-
making,60 thus cultivating a fear of bad faith.61 
Other research nevertheless suggests that a positive consensus can be reached through 
appropriate discussions. In a study of their unit at GOSH over three years, Brierley et al found 
that, following initial discussions, 186 out of 203 cases resulted in parents agreeing with 
 
56 G Birchley and R Huxtable, ‘Critical Decisions for Critically Ill Infants’, in C Stanton, S Devaney, 
A-M Farrell and A Mullock (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of Margaret Brazier 
(London, Routledge, 2016) 120.  
57 C Charles, A Gafni and T Whelan, ‘Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What Does 
it Mean? (or it Takes at Least Two to Tango)’ (1997) 44 Social Science and Medicine 681; C Munthe, 
L Sandman and D Cutas, ‘Person Centred Care and Shared Decision-Making: Implications for Ethics, 
Public Health and Research’ (2012) 20 Health Care Analysis 231. 
58 G Birchley, ‘Deciding Together? Best Interests and Shared Decision-Making in Paediatric Intensive 
Care’ (2014) 22 Health Care Analysis 203. 
59 Birchley and Huxtable (n 56), 121. 
60 G Birchley, R Gooberman-Hill, Z Deans, J Fraser and R Huxtable, ‘“Best Interests” in Paediatric 
Intensive Care: An Empirical Ethics Study’ (2017) 102 Archives of Disease in Childhood 930, 932. 
61 C Shaw, E Stokoe, K Gallagher, N Aladangady and N Marlow, ‘Parental Involvement in Neonatal 
Critical Care Decision-Making’ (2016) 38 Sociology of Health & Illness 1217. 
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clinicians that continued treatment was not in the child’s best interests.62 Six of the remaining 
17 cases were resolved following further discussions with the families. In this study, 
discussions between the team and the family therefore generated consensus about treatment 
withdrawal in 94.58% of the cases.  
Gard demonstrates that discussions in GOSH do not always lead to consensus, but its 
reputation as a world-renowned specialist hospital and the expertise of its staff might explain 
its success in achieving consensus in many cases. The literature further reveals the importance 
of good communication to reaching resolution. Communication, of course, is a two-way 
process, and Richards suggests that a key component of good communication is that clinicians 
not only talk, but also listen to families and explore their views, including those about 
alternative treatment options.63 As for what clinicians say to families, Birchley et al’s study 
reveals that clinicians will sometimes need to reframe conversations in terms more acceptable 
to families,64 with Waldman and Frader cautioning that words like ‘futile’, ‘harm’ and 
‘suffering’ might cause parents to feel they are being accused of not doing what is best for their 
child.65  
Communication evidently matters and Forbat et al have found communication breakdown to 
be the most common cause of conflict between families and healthcare professionals in 
children’s healthcare.66 Amongst the reasons for such breakdown are, first, pejorative labelling 
by clinicians of those parents who disagree with them. Forbat et al refer to this as a factor in 
the escalation of conflict in paediatric healthcare disputes.67 In this vein, one might refer to a 
clinician’s email, which described the parents in Gard as a ‘spanner in the works’.68 
 
62 J Brierley, J Linthicum and A Petros, ‘Should Religious Beliefs Be Allowed to Stonewall a Secular 
Approach to Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Children?’ (2013) 39 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 573, 573. 
63 T Richards, ‘When Doctors and Patients Disagree’ (2014) British Medical Journal Online, www-
bmj-com.bris.idm.oclc.org/content/bmj/349/bmj.g5567.full.pdf. 
64 Birchley et al (n 60), 932. 
65 E Waldman and J Frader, ‘Charlie Gard: How Did Things Go Wrong?’ (2018) 6 Current Paediatric 
Reports 173, 174; See also: R Taylor, ‘Parental Decisions and Court Jurisdiction: Best Interests or 
Significant Harm?’, chapter 3 above. One reason Taylor gives for rejecting the application of the 
‘significant harm’ test to such disputes ‘is that it would be unnecessarily cruel and combative to require 
loving and sincere parents to defend themselves against a test based on harm’ (XXX). 
66 L Forbat, C Sayer, P McNamee, E Menson and S Barclay, ‘Conflict in a Paediatric Hospital: A 
Prospective Mixed Method Study’ (2016) 101 Archives of Disease in Childhood 23, 25. 
67 L Forbat, B Teuten and S Barclay, ‘Conflict Escalation in Paediatric Services: Findings from a 
Qualitative Study’ (2015) Archives of Disease in Childhood 1, 3. 
68 Gard (n 45), [84]. 
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Second, clinicians and parents will sometimes have different understandings of key terms or 
information. Forbat et al refer to divergent interpretations of terms such as ‘futility’ or 
prognostic information.69 Such differences can arise, suggest Fassier and Azoulay, because 
families weigh the clinician’s prognostic information against factors such as their own 
perception of the patient’s strength of character and will to live, and the patient’s history of 
illness and survival.70 Evans exemplifies this, with the trial judge noting that the parents, having 
been told early on in their son’s treatment to prepare for ‘the real possibility that [he] might not 
recover’,71 viewed his initial recovery as ‘indicative of his potential for more general 
recovery’.72 Haastrup is another example of parents rejecting medical views in favour of their 
own. The judge recorded that ‘neither parent is able to accept the consensus medical view’ that 
Isaiah’s condition was caused by his severe brain injury. Instead, the parents believed the 
inability to wean their son from the ventilator was due to the medication he was receiving.73 
Third, clinicians and families will sometimes differ in their views about decisional authority. 
According to Forbat et al, many families believe that decisions about withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment should be made jointly between themselves and the clinical team, but 
a minority believe this should be a matter for the parents alone to decide.74 Other studies 
support the latter point: essentially, some parents maintain that life-or-death decisions about 
their offspring are theirs to make.75 
Even where the parties disagree about these (or other) matters, it is not necessarily the case that 
disagreement will develop into an intractable conflict.76 Such escalation might even be avoided 
– and consensus potentially achieved – if discussions can enable the parties to identify areas of 
disagreement and clinicians are trained to recognise and manage conflict at an early stage.77 
 
69 Forbat et al (n 66), 24. 
70 T Fassier and E Azoulay, ‘Conflicts and Communication Gaps in the Intensive Care Unit’ (2010) 16 
Current Opinion in Critical Care 654, 661. 
71 Evans (n 52), [10]. 
72 ibid. 
73 Haastrup (n 51), [59] 
74 Forbat et al (n 66), 23. 
75 L Gillam and J Sullivan, ‘Ethics at the End of Life: Who Should Make Decisions about Treatment 
Limitation for Young Children with Life-Threatening or Life-Limiting Conditions?’ (2011) 47 Journal 
of Paediatrics and Child Health 594; Birchley et al (n 61), 932. 
76 D Wilkinson, S Barclay and J Savulescu, ‘Disagreement, Mediation, Arbitration: Resolving Disputes 
about Medical Treatment’ (2018) 391 Lancet 2302, 2304. 
77 Fassier and Azoulay (n 70), 661; Forbat et al (n 68), 4; S Barclay, ‘Recognising and Managing 
Conflict Between Patients, Parents and Health Professionals’ (2016) 26 Paediatrics and Child Health 
314, 314. 
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But ongoing discussion can also impose costs, and not only on the parents and clinicians. First, 
ongoing discussion can exacerbate, rather than resolve, a dispute. If there is a breakdown in 
communication and trust that is not resolved, this can lead to both sides becoming entrenched 
in their positions,78 rendering third-party intervention necessary.79 However, as we will see, 
clinicians can be reluctant to seek such intervention, and particularly court proceedings, for 
fear of costs, negative publicity, inconsistent decisions or being seen as a failure by 
colleagues.80 Such reluctance might incline clinicians to continue a discursive process, which 
is nevertheless failing to progress towards resolution. But quite when discussions should be 
deemed to have failed, and third-party intervention sought, is (as yet) unclear.81 Second, 
ongoing discussion might be contrary to the interests of the child. In the absence of agreement 
about non- treatment/treatment, the status quo is likely to be maintained, meaning the child will 
continue to receive the contested treatment. This may not be in the child’s best interests – and 
might even be harmful.82 In addition to the child, there are also the interests of the disputants 
to consider. Research suggests, for example, that healthcare professionals can experience moral 
distress as a consequence of being asked to treat a child contrary to what they feel is in the 
child’s best interests.83 
These observations suggest that communication and ongoing discussions between the 
stakeholders are important, but they also reveal at least two questions, which future research 
might usefully explore. First, at what point should clinicians (or, indeed, other parties) 
recognise that discussion is no longer effective and third-party intervention should be sought? 
Second, which form(s) of third-party intervention are indicated, and in which circumstances? 
We will start to explore the latter question in the following sections, beginning with the use of 
second medical opinions.  
4. Second Opinion Experts 
 
78 Forbat et al (n 67), 3. 
79 ibid; RD William Hain, ‘Voices of Moral Authority: Parents, Doctors and What Will Actually Help’ 
(2018) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 458, 460; Wilkinson et al (n 75), 2304. 
80 Brierley et al (n 62), 576; Birchley et al (n 60), 932. 
81 Birchley and Huxtable (n 56), 121. 
82 Brierley et al (n 62), 576. 
83 ibid; G Morley, C Bradbury-Jones and J Ives, ‘Moral Distress in End-of-Life Care’ forthcoming, 6. 
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If discussions between the team and family have not resulted in agreement, then further clinical 
opinions might be sought. This, however, appears to be an under-researched phenomenon in 
this context. It is apparent that second (or third or more) opinions will sometimes be sought by 
clinicians and sometimes by families.84 Such consultation might occur within or without the 
context of court proceedings, and, indeed, might even be ordered by a court. Those consulted 
can come from within the institution or from elsewhere, including from overseas; indeed, in all 
of the recent legal cases, both UK and non-UK experts were instructed. 
Beyond these indications, however, there appears to be a lack of research into when and how 
second opinions are sought, who determines which expert is instructed, and any role they might 
play in addressing or resolving conflict. Some suspect that such additional opinions can prove 
useful, for example if the family’s interpretation of the medical facts differs from those of the 
treating clinicians.85 Families will also sometimes disagree with the clinicians about the 
treatment to be given, with Forbat et al noting that this is the second most common cause of 
conflict.86 In such cases, an independent view might prove helpful.  
The utility of such opinions is not, however, established in the literature. In their study, Brierley 
et al noted that second opinions were sought in six of the 203 cases in which withdrawal of 
treatment was recommended. However, in none of those six cases did resolution result from 
the provision of the additional opinion. The authors suggested that this was due to the 
intractable religious views held by the parents in those cases,87 and the study does not provide 
evidence that second opinions, in general, are ineffective.  
But other authors do express concerns about the gathering of such opinions. First, the second 
opinion might lack – or be perceived to lack – the requisite independence. Meller and Barclay 
note this as a risk when the treating team, rather than the family, select the expert. To avoid 
that risk, they propose that families select the expert.88 However, the family’s satisfaction will 
also depend on what the expert says: in Haastrup, the father instructed his own expert, but he 
viewed that expert as colluding with the NHS when the expert took the same view as the 
treating clinicians.89 Meller and Barclay also raise the concern that allowing families to select 
 
84 Brierley et al (n 62), 576; S Meller and S Barclay, ‘Mediation: An Approach to Intractable Disputes 
Between Parents and Paediatricians’ (2011) 96 Archives of Disease in Childhood 619, 619. 
85 Wilkinson et al (n 76), 2304. 
86 Forbat et al (n 66), 25. 
87 Brierley et al (n 62), 574. 
88 Meller and Barclay (n 84), 619. 
89 Haastrup (n 51), [46].  
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the expert will lead to families ‘doctor-shopping’ for those experts likely to share their view.90 
For example, in Gard, the mother’s Internet research revealed the possibility of an experimental 
treatment, which led to the instruction of an expert from the United States.91 Such cherry-
picking can then lead to a second potential area of difficulty, if the expert departs from the view 
of the treating clinicians and this exacerbates the conflict.92 This appears to be what happened 
in Gard, as the expert’s views did indeed differ from those of the responsible team.93  
These are, however, only indications and further research appears to be needed. Such research 
could, in particular, explore how often second opinions are sought, how the process works, and 
its effectiveness, or otherwise, in resolving disputes.  
5. Clinical Ethics Consultation 
Clinical ethics support services are another source of external input to the clinicians (and, 
occasionally, patients and their families). Such services take different forms internationally but, 
in the UK, a clinical ethics committee (CEC) model dominates. Unlike their research-facing 
counterparts, CECs are not legally mandatory or even regulated as such. During the passage of 
the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill through the House of Lords, an amendment was tabled 
that would have required all NHS bodies to have access to CECs.94 However, the proposed 
amendment was subsequently withdrawn in favour of discussions with the minister instead.95 
Pending any such change in the law, the UK Clinical Ethics Network (UKCEN) provides 
leadership, by seeking to promote clinical ethics support and facilitate communication between 
UK CECs.96 It describes CECs as ‘multidisciplinary groups, including health professionals and 
lay members that aim to provide support for decision-making on ethical issues arising from the 
 
90 Meller and Barclay (n 84), 619. 
91 Gard (n 45), [71]–[72].  
92 C Wallis, ‘When Paediatricians and Families Can’t Agree’ (2018) 103 Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 413, 413. 
93 In the court hearings, the US expert acknowledged that the treatment was unlikely to work, although 
he felt, if the parents wanted to try it, then it should be provided, given the lack of other treatment 
options: Gard (n 45), [18]–[19]. 
94 The proposed amendment also included provision for regulations to be made as to their membership, 
funding and constitution. See publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0117/18117-I(a).pdf. 
Parental access to CECs in the case of disagreements about the care of critically ill children is being 
sought by Charlie Gard’s parents as part of the proposed ‘Charlie’s Law’, Charlie Gard Foundation, 
‘Charlie’s Law’, www.thecharliegardfoundation.org/charlies-law/. 
95 Hansard HL vol 793 cols 387–88 (15 October 2018). 
96 UK Clinical Ethics Network, ‘About the Network’, www.ukcen.net/main/about. 
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provision of patient care within NHS Trusts and other health care institutions’.97 Committees 
therefore tend to include health professionals, lay members, legal members and ‘ethicists’, but 
they have no fixed structure, function or membership criteria, and their constitution varies 
between settings.98 The number of UK committees (voluntarily) registered with UKCEN waxes 
and wanes, from 20 in 2000, to 85 in 2009,99 to 77 in 2018.100 Where they exist, CECs tend to 
be involved in education and policy, as well as – of most relevance here – case consultation.  
CECs tend to have an advisory remit: they issue advice on request, rather than making decisions 
about (for example) ethically contentious cases. There are, however, many questions 
surrounding UK committees, including about the extent to which their advice is sought. The 
literature suggests that CECs are infrequently utilised as a mechanism for dispute resolution,101 
with most UK committees advising on 1–10 cases a year.102 As many CECs are based in large 
NHS Trusts, the referrals they receive will span a variety of patients and specialties. However, 
even in paediatric settings, referrals appear to be low, with Brierley et al noting that only six of 
the 186 contested cases in their study were referred for ethical review.103 The relative scarcity 
of ethical review also appears to be borne out in the recent legal cases: only in Gard is reference 
made to CEC input.104  
They may appear to be relatively under-utilised, but commentators nevertheless believe that 
CECs have the potential to contribute positively to the resolution of difficult cases. Three 
groups of reasons tend to be given. First, ‘CECs seek to provide practical advice, thus neither 
amounting to a mere “talking shop”, nor posing a threat to clinical autonomy’.105 Second, CECs 
explicitly focus on the ethical dimensions of the case before them, which suggests they might 
be well equipped to advise on values-based disputes. For example, as was the case in 
 
97 UK Clinical Ethics Network, ‘Clinical Ethics Committees’ www.ukcen.net/committees/introduction. 
98 Birchley and Huxtable (n 56), 123; UK Clinical Ethics Network (n 97). 
99 V Larcher, ‘The Development and Function of Clinical Ethics Committees (CECs) in the United 
Kingdom’ (2009) 22 Diametros 47, 48. 
100 UK Clinical Ethics Network, ‘CEC Member List’, www.ukcen.net/committees/member_list. 
101 A Fiester, ‘The Failure of the Consult Model: Why “Mediation” Should Replace “Consultation”’ 
(2007) 7 American Journal of Bioethics 31, 32. 
102 AM Slowther, L McClimans and C Price, ‘Development of Clinical Ethics Services in the UK: A 
National Survey’ (2012) 38 Journal of Medical Ethics 210, 212–13. 
103 Brierley et al (n 62), 574. The CEC’s advice did not lead to resolution in those six cases, which the 
authors attribute to the parents’ decisions being driven by fundamentalist religious beliefs that they were 
not prepared to discuss.  
104 Gard (n 45), [17] and [59]. It should be noted, however, that some CECs do not offer formal advice 
and will only act to help the clinical team work through the presenting problem. 
105 Huxtable (n 8), 473.  
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Haastrup,106 a clinician might believe that treatment should stop, but a family with particular 
religious beliefs – such as in the sanctity of life – might want treatment to continue.107 In such 
cases, a CEC could help to identify and elucidate the underlying ethical values, and point to 
areas of commonality or in which a compromise might be achieved, through which efforts 
resolution might then be reached.108 Moreover, CECs appear to have the experience (and 
perhaps even some form of expertise) in addressing dilemmas such as those considered here, 
since they notably tend to be consulted about such issues as withdrawing or withholding life-
supporting treatment.109 Indeed, some CECs exist in specialist settings – like GOSH’s 
committee110 – which implies they will have a specialist body of experience (and, again, 
perhaps also specialist expertise).111 Third, CECs are intended to be supportive and as such 
they may have advantages over their competitors. For example, relative to the courts, CECs 
are able to pool diverse, pertinent expertise and they are less formal and costly (in both financial 
and emotional terms).112 Although data is lacking, not only about how often CECs are used, 
but also about whether their advice is accepted,113 some parties do record high satisfaction 
rates.114  
The news is not all good, however. Amongst the ‘unresolved issues’ noted by Weise and Daly 
are ‘questions about qualifications for clinical ethicists, required competencies, the 
appropriateness of formal certification or licensure, and metrics for evaluation’.115 The main 
concerns can be gathered into three groups. First, there are problems of orientation. UK CECs 
are typically there to support clinicians, which raises questions about their availability and 
 
106 Haastrup (n 51), [54]. 
107 Brierley et al (n 52), 576. 
108 Wilkinson et al (n 76), 2304; Huxtable (n 19), 156–57. 
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commitment to patients and their families,116 their accountability,117 and their independence 
from the healthcare setting.118 The parents and nurses interviewed by Birchley were supportive 
of CEC involvement in paediatric disputes, although those participants did not have direct 
experience of CECs.119 Others’ concerns about bias and the like might nevertheless be assuaged 
if, for example, parents and nurses are permitted to bring referrals;120 indeed, as we noted, 
Charlie Gard’s parents have proposed legislation that would ensure such access.121 As for those 
receiving the referrals as members of the committee, it is also possible – as GOSH’s CEC 
evinces – to include in the membership those who have direct (‘lay’) experience of care in the 
relevant setting.122 
Second, there are questions of operation and process, which McLean pithily captures when 
she refers to CECs as a ‘due process wasteland’,123 and asks: ‘[W]hat and who are clinical 
ethics committees for?’124 The relative informality of CECs may appear to be a strength but, 
as Weise and Daly noted, there are concerns about the qualifications, certification and 
competencies of CEC members, and about the ethical deliberation frameworks that CECs use 
to reach their advice.125 As things stand, there are no formal requirements for the expertise or 
training required to sit on such committees,126 and Birchley’s study noted that one of the 
criticisms paediatric clinicians had of CECs was their lack of paediatric experience.127 Fiester 
has argued that lack of training and expertise may bring into question CECs’ right to be 
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involved in decisions that affect the lives of others.128 Having the ‘wrong’ sort of expertise or 
focus can be problematic: some of Birchley’s clinicians felt that CECs have too great a legal 
focus,129 but legal scholars (eg McLean) have conversely queried whether CECs sufficiently 
attend to legal concerns, such as those associated with due process, transparency and 
consistency.130 But quite what the requisite expertise should be remains an open – and vexed – 
question.131  
Another vexed question is whether a CEC is even the best model for providing clinical ethics 
support. Other models exist, such as clinical ethics consultants, although these tend to be rare 
in the UK.132 Of course, what counts as the ‘best’ (or even just an ‘appropriate’) model remains 
to be seen, and this leads onto a third area of difficulty, concerning the impact and evaluation 
of clinical ethics support. The impact of CECs is questionable, not least because they lack the 
ability formally to resolve disputes by determining the outcome: they only offer advice to 
clinicians, which the clinicians are free to reject.133 But, again, quite what is to count as impact 
in this context, and how it is to be evaluated, merits further research.134 
CECs therefore show promise but also appear to have their pitfalls. Amongst the many 
proposals for improving CECs are: ensuring that committees are pluralistically composed and 
that members have training in (for example) communication and conflict management;135 
having specialist committees with subject-specific expertise;136 and formalising committees, 
including through the creation of an appeals process and auditing and evaluation of decision-
making.137 Further research is nevertheless needed into CECs and these proposals, including 
those for alternative types of clinical ethics services. 
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6. Mediation 
One alternative to CECs, which is beginning to be explored in this context, is mediation. 
Mediation is a flexible, confidential process which involves a neutral third party helping the 
parties in dispute towards a negotiated resolution, where the parties have the final say as to 
whether agreement is reached and, if so, on what terms.138 Already familiar in some other 
contexts, there is growing interest in mediation as a method for resolving paediatric healthcare 
disputes, following the establishment of the Medical Mediation Foundation in 2010.139   
The use of mediation in this context has attracted support including, in Gard, from Francis J.140 
Mediation is said to have various benefits. First, the method allows for – indeed, requires – 
open discussion, which might help to rebuild relationships and restore trust.141 The method can 
therefore be contrasted with more adversarial mechanisms, such as recourse to law. Second, 
and again in contrast to court proceedings, the timing is flexible: Wilkinson et al note that 
mediation can be attempted at any stage of a dispute.142 There is also, third, flexibility over 
who can be involved in the process – unlike, again, court proceedings.143 Input beyond that of 
the disputing clinicians and parents can prove beneficial: Brierley et al, for example, found that 
involving religious leaders in discussions of end-of-life care aided resolution of disputes.144  
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Despite these advantages, mediation also has its drawbacks and uncertainties. First, the process 
requires voluntary engagement and a willingness on the part of the disputants to move beyond 
their initial positions.145 Not every disputant will be so inclined. Indeed, according to the 
Trust’s legal counsel, mediation failed in Evans because the family and their advisors did not 
genuinely engage with the process.146 It is not only families who might fail to engage, however. 
Second, research by Forbat et al found that healthcare staff see mediation as a mechanism of 
last resort.147 Yet, as Evans arguably illustrates, such a waiting game might doom mediation to 
fail because, by the time it is attempted, relationships have broken down and the parties have 
become entrenched in their positions.  
Even if the parties do sincerely engage, third, there is the risk that important elements of the 
dispute might be missed. Disputes in this context appear often to rest on conflicting ethical 
positions, which mediation might fail to draw out or seek to resolve.148 To address such a 
concern, scholars suggest that mediation should be underpinned by an ethical framework and 
be directed towards the goal of achieving an ethical outcome.149 Proponents of mediation, such 
as Meller and Barclay, agree that effective mediation in this context requires mediators to be 
equipped with knowledge of medical law and medical ethics, an understanding of paediatric 
issues, and access to independent expert advice.150  
These latter proposals suggest that CECs and mediation might usefully be brought together, 
since they apparently offer different ways of fulfilling the same, or at least similar, functions. 
CECs can provide the requisite ethical reflection, whilst mediation brings an impartiality and 
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independence that CECs might lack. Whether the two can and should be brought together looks 
like a promising line of research. Research into mediation in this context is certainly needed, 
in order to ascertain when and how it is used and its effectiveness.151 In Brierley et al’s study 
of dispute resolution, there was no reference made to mediation being used.152 Research is now 
underway, primarily through the Medical Mediation Foundation’s Evelina Resolution Project, 
which offers mediation services as well as conflict recognition and management training.153 
However, its data to date has focused upon conflict management training, rather than on 
mediation.154 Allen has suggested that the lack of data on the success (or otherwise) of 
mediation is due to mediation being confidential.155 However, data on the extent of mediation 
and whether this has led to resolution could be gathered and reported (subject to the parties’ 
agreement) without breaching confidentiality. In sum, mediation, like clinical ethics support, 
looks promising, but more research is needed to ascertain the advantages and disadvantages 
that this approach to paediatric disputes offers.  
7. Courts 
Finally, the courts are available to make decisions in contested cases. Proceedings may be 
brought under the Children Act 1989, according to which the ‘welfare of the child’ shall be the 
court’s ‘paramount consideration’,156 or under the inherent jurisdiction, where the focus is on 
the ‘best interests’ of the child. Although there are procedural differences,157 the courts have 
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confirmed that welfare and best interests are to be treated as synonymous.158 Since the early 
1980s, the courts have adjudicated on numerous cases involving critically ill infants.159  
There are various reasons why courts might be considered appropriate and effective fora for 
resolving such disputes, three of which we will mention here. First, unlike the other 
mechanisms we have considered, courts provide authoritative judgments about what treatment 
(or care) may – perhaps must – be given.160 In short, courts can decide and thereby settle a 
dispute. Second, in apparent contrast to some of the preceding alternatives, the legal process is 
rigorous. Judges are, for example, able to evaluate a variety of evidence,161 and, whilst it is 
undoubtedly subject to criticism, the legal process aspires to impartiality and does enjoy some 
credibility as a means of decisively settling disputes. Third, and despite its procedural rigour, 
the legal process also allows for some flexibility, including in the sorts of evidence to be 
considered. Judges can, for example, engage with the ethical dimensions of the cases before 
them – as indeed has occurred in paediatric disputes.162 
Despite these apparent advantages, recourse to the courts appears to be relatively rare. 
Although not every ruling is reported, there annually appear to be only two or three such cases 
coming before the courts.163 The literature nevertheless indicates that there are many more 
disputes occurring in paediatric healthcare settings. Brierley et al’s study supports this 
impression, wherein only one of the disputed cases was litigated.164 Infrequent recourse to the 
courts might be attributable to their perceived disadvantages, five of which we will note.  
First, the legal process is adversarial, which generates the impression that there are winners 
and losers.165 This is not necessarily an appropriate framing, particularly in an ethically 
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sensitive context such as the present one, which does not necessarily encompass ethical blacks 
and whites but might instead be replete with ethical shades of grey.166 Furthermore, and 
contrary to the earlier observation, the courts will not always be willing or equipped to attend 
to these complex ethical dimensions.167  
Second, an adversarial framing can have adverse effects on the protagonists and, indeed, on the 
(already compromised) relationship between them. Fassier and Azoulay noted concerns 
expressed by ICU staff that court action could amplify the feelings of frustration and grief in 
such disputes,168 resulting in the proceedings escalating the conflict and entrenchment of 
different views, as the focus shifts to the conflict itself, rather than the child.169 This could then 
lead to a complete loss of trust between the family and healthcare staff,170 with the involvement 
of the media and social media further contributing to a climate of fear and distrust.171 Brierley 
et al noted that fear of negative publicity was one reason why healthcare professionals are 
reluctant to utilise court proceedings.172 There are also suggestions that, when judicial decisions 
are sought, relationships can suffer – regardless of who ‘wins’ or ‘loses’. If the judge decides 
that treatment should be withdrawn contrary to the parents’ wishes, then the parents will 
obviously feel that their assessment of the welfare of their child has been overruled.173 But even 
the ‘winning’ clinicians need not be entirely satisfied, since the decision will signal that, whilst 
they had been seeking resolution, they had been treating the child against his or her best 
interests.174 Alternatively, if the judge decides that treatment should be provided, then this 
might further erode the parents’ trust in the clinicians and create a conflict for the clinicians 
between honouring the legal ruling and acting in what they perceive to be the best interests of 
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the child. In short, an adversarial process can impose costs on the parties, including, of course, 
on the child.175 
Third, the costs are not only emotional or relational, but also financial.176 There will be the 
costs associated with providing ongoing treatment to the child until the judicial decision is 
issued (and that decision, of course, might be that treatment should not be given).177 There are 
also the costs of the legal proceedings themselves. Such costs will often be borne by Trusts, 
but one might wonder whether this is a good use of the limited NHS budget, when cheaper, 
potentially less divisive mechanisms exist. If, instead, parents must fund the proceedings, then 
there is a paucity of legal aid funding, but even where this is available, it will not always cover 
the entire costs.178 The parents in Gard managed to secure pro bono representation, but this 
will not be available to all parents; the judge in Gard understandably expressed the view that, 
in such cases, legal aid should be available.179 Turning to the child, the state will also meet the 
costs of the Children’s Guardian, who will appear to represent the child. This appears to be 
legitimate expenditure, since the Guardian represents the interests of the child independent of 
the views of his or her parents or doctors; however, Meller and Barclay have queried whether 
the Guardian is truly independent, given the apparent frequency with which the Guardian 
concurs with medical opinion.180 
Fourth, the courts’ reasoning about the best interests of the child can appear inconsistent, 
opaque and unpredictable. The parties to a case will receive a determinate outcome but the 
judgments arguably fail to issue guidance that is sufficient to inform future decision-makers. 
The Children Act only enumerates some of the factors to be considered,181 with the judges 
enjoying a great deal of discretion in the interpretation of a child’s best interests.182 The factors 
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– and the weight accorded to them – that inform best-interests decisions appear to vary between 
cases.183 Close et al have called on the courts to be clearer in their written judgments about the 
factors that influenced their decision, the weight given to those factors and the reasons for 
this.184 The language used can also add confusion; for example, there may be references to 
treatment being ‘futile’, without judges explaining how that has been interpreted in a particular 
case.185 The perceived lack of clarity might explain Brierley et al and Birchley et al’s findings 
that healthcare professionals were reluctant to seek court orders because of uncertainty as to 
the likely outcome.186 Such findings raise the concern that clinicians will only seek court 
hearings if they are confident that the court will support their decision about treatment (a 
concern which echoes that of parents ‘cherry-picking’ second-opinion experts). Further 
research could usefully explore whether there are better alternatives to the best-interests 
standard, such as the ‘harm standard’ (which featured in Gard187),188 or whether there might be 
better approaches to the interpretation and operationalisation of the existing standard. 
The final drawback of legal proceedings is that these entail delay.189 Proceedings that make it 
to court can be time consuming. Bridgeman has noted that, despite being fast-tracked, the 
proceedings in Gard lasted for five months, including the appeals.190 As already noted, during 
this time, the healthcare team are continuing to treat the child, potentially contrary to what they 
consider to be in the child’s best interests. This was recognised by the Supreme Court in Gard 
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when they considered whether to continue to stay proceedings whilst the parents pursued the 
appeals:  
The hospital finds itself in an acutely difficult ethical dilemma: although the stays have made 
it lawful to continue to provide him with AVNH [artificial ventilation, nutrition and 
hydration], it considers it professionally wrong for it to have continued for over two months to 
act otherwise than in his best interests.191 
Similar timescales were seen in Haastrup (three months) and Evans (five months), although in 
Haastrup there was no substantive appeal hearing. Some cases are quicker: King was dealt with 
within two weeks, but the key difference there was that the Trust did not oppose the parents’ 
desire for alternative treatment. The courts need to balance procedural fairness with 
expediency,192 but the prospect of delays can deter clinicians from seeking judicial 
resolution.193 Yet, this is not the only reported reason for clinicians’ reluctance. Birchley et al 
found that some clinicians saw the avoidance of court as a measure of personal and professional 
success.194 This implies that courts are used only as a last resort, and Wallis notes that 
paediatricians are usually advised only to seek a judgment when the dispute has become 
entrenched and reached an impasse.195 However, waiting for this impasse could further 
undermine the trusting relationship and encourage an adversarial approach towards 
proceedings, thus further contributing to the sense that courts are not appropriate mechanisms 
for resolving paediatric healthcare disputes. 
In summary, the courts have their benefits – not least in issuing authoritative decisions that 
settle disputes – but they also have various drawbacks. In addition to investigating alternatives 
to the courts, future research could usefully explore how legal processes, approaches and the 
best-interests standard might be amended to address these problems, as we presume there will 
always remain some role for the courts to play, particularly in intractable disputes.  
8. Conclusion 
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Commenting on a high-profile ruling back in 2005, Margaret Brazier asked whether there are 
alternatives to court proceedings, when disputes about a child’s healthcare become intractable 
or threaten to do so.196 Alternatives certainly exist, including discussions between families and 
healthcare professionals, as well as recourse to other parties, such as second-opinion experts, 
CECs and mediators. However, despite the benefits they may bring, each of these alternatives 
has their own problems and there appears to be a reluctance amongst healthcare professionals 
to seeking external input when such disputes arise, with such recourse being seen to be a ‘last 
resort’. Discussions between the parties appear, overwhelmingly, to be the preferred method 
of dispute resolution but, as we have seen, such discussion might have the effect of 
exacerbating the conflict, as well as potentially being contrary to the child’s interests. Further 
research is needed, however, to identify the point at which clinicians (or, indeed, other parties) 
should recognise that discussion is no longer effective and third-party intervention should be 
sought. The question then becomes: which form(s) of third-party intervention are indicated, 
and in which circumstances?  
Second-opinion experts may be beneficial in demonstrating to the family that the clinicians’ 
proposed course of action is the ‘right’ one. Yet, the cases of Gard,197 Haastrup198 and Evans199 
are stark reminders that a second (or even third) opinion might not resolve the dispute if the 
parties are unwilling to accept an opinion that differs from their own. This is, however, an 
under-researched means to resolution and further research could explore how often second 
opinions are sought, how the process works, and whether it is effective at resolving disputes. 
Clinical ethics support services also have the potential to resolve such disputes and, in light of 
the Charlie Gard Foundation’s campaign for access to CECs as part of ‘Charlie’s law’,200 there 
may be growing public support for this mechanism. Access alone, however, is not enough, and 
to ensure this is an effective resolution mechanism, further research is needed to understand 
how often CECs are used and the extent to which their advice is accepted and/or resolves 
disputes. There are also questions to be addressed around the nature of their composition, 
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expertise, training, impact, evaluation and so on, and whether CECs offer the best model of 
ethics support or whether there are (in some sense) better alternatives. 
There is also growing support, including amongst judges, for mediation as a means of resolving 
disputes about the healthcare of children.201 The creation of the Medical Mediation Foundation 
means that mediators are available in these cases. However, more data is needed on how often 
mediation is used and when it is ‘successful’. The Evelina Resolution Project is collecting data, 
which should provide some answers to these questions in due course. But further research 
might usefully explore whether mediation could be combined with ethics support, so as to 
enable the impartial and independent steering of negotiations, where those negotiations are 
alert to their ethical dimensions. 
Finally, whilst courts are used infrequently and as a last resort for resolving such disputes, it is 
likely their input will continue to be necessary in those cases that are truly intractable. The 
courts therefore should not be absent from future research agendas. Pertinent research questions 
include when recourse to court (as opposed to some other mechanism) is necessary and how 
the court should approach the best-interests standard. The latter standard underpins decisions 
in this context, but is this the right standard, understood and operationalised in appropriate 
ways, or are adjustments or alternatives required? Work to address questions around the best-
interests standard is underway in the Balancing Best Interests in Health Care, Ethics and Law 
(BABEL) project, a five-year programme of work funded by the Wellcome Trust. The project 
asks how the best interests of incapacitated patients should be understood: which factors and 
values should be considered, who should be involved, and indeed is ‘best interests’ the best 
approach?202  
In sum, further work is needed to understand, in the context of resolving child healthcare 
disputes, what the current situation actually is and what the situation should be. Such research 
could explore: when, why, how and the extent to which the different resolution mechanisms 
are used; how they serve to secure resolution; how (if at all) existing mechanisms should be 
amended; and, ultimately, which process (or processes) should be used in these cases of 
conflict? Some progress towards answering these questions has been made since Brazier’s 
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inquiry in 2005, but the recent suite of widely discussed rulings suggests that more work is 
needed in this area.  
  
